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Abstract
Contract farming has often been associated with an increase in the
income of participating households. It is unclear, however, whether
contract farming increases other aspects of household welfare. Using
data from six regions of Madagascar and a selection-on-observables
design in which we control for a households marginal utility of par-
ticipating in contract farming, which we elicited via a contingent val-
uation experiment, we show that participating in contract farming
reduces the duration of a households hungry season by about ten
days on average, and that it makes participating households about
20 percent more likely to see their hungry season end at any point
in time. Further, we nd that these e¤ects are more pronounced for
households with a larger number of children, and for households with
a larger number of girls. This is an important result as children
especially girls often bear the burden of food insecurity.
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1 Introduction
Although the benets of economic specialization have been widely under-
stood since the publication of Adam Smiths (1776, 1976)Wealth of Nations,
if not earlier, a persistent lack of specialization is one of the prime factors en-
abling economic underdevelopment in most of the worlds poorest countries.
In those countries, whose economies remain largely agrarian, the structural
transformation, or transition from subsistence to commercial agriculture, has
so far proven elusive.
One of the rst steps in the transition from subsistence to commercial
agriculture that is, the transition from many smallholder farmers producing
small quantities of several crops for home consumption to fewer large farms
producing large quantities of one or two crops for sale is the emergence of
an intermediate sector between the agricultural and manufacturing sectors.
The institution that perhaps best represents the emergence of such an agro-
industrial sector is contract farming, or the economic institution wherein a
processing rm contracts the production of commercial crops out to small-
holder farmers, and which constitutes the cornerstone of agricultural value
chains. In one of the earliest studies of contract farming in economics, Grosh
(1994) noted that the institution can resolve several market failures which
result from risk and uncertainty, imperfect factor markets, and reluctance
to adopt new technology. Since then, contract farming has been studied in
many countries and across many crops, and the institution has often been
hailed by policy makers as a tool for rural poverty alleviation.
But does participation in agricultural value chains make people better
o¤? Although there is an important literature exploring the e¤ects of par-
ticipation in contract farming on household income or some variant thereof
(Porter and Phillips-Howard, 1997; Singh, 2002; Warning and Key, 2002;
Simmons, 2005; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Minten et al., 2009; Miyata et
al., 2009; Rao and Qaim, 2011; Barrett et al., 2012; Bellemare, 2012; Michel-
son, 2013; Narayanan, 2014),1 we study whether participation in contract
farming improves food security, dened here as the duration of the hungry
season experienced by a household, i.e., the length of time during which
members of the household go without three meals a day. This question is
important for three reasons. First, because the hungry season coincides with
1A notable exception is Dedehouanou et al. (2013), who look at the impact of con-
tracting on the subjective well-being of farmers in Senegal.
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those weeks and months before households get cash for their crops at har-
vest, it is not immediately obvious that the households involved in contract
farming can or will save the extra income from contract farming (Dupas and
Robinson, 2013); there is value in knowing whether income gains translate
into other gains.2 Second, self-control problems are more common among
the poor and those who live at the margin (Banerjee and Mullainathan,
2010), and it is not clear whether the cash a household receives at harvest
will be spent on necessities like food. Third, as a recent International Food
Policy Research Institute discussion paper put it:
Income growth alone cannot solve the problem of malnutri-
tion ... The challenge from the nutrition perspective is how to
sustainably improve the quality of diets, as well as other health-
nutrition related behaviors, across di¤erent populations and age
groups? (sic) In nutrition debates in developing countries there is
growing interest in the capacity of the private sector to contribute
to improved nutrition outcomes ... Discussions have incorporated
thinking around value chain frameworks, which emerged in the
late 1990s to help development actors design interventions that
responded to the needs of the private sector and contributed to
development outcomes. Value chain approaches can provide use-
ful frameworks to examine the food system and the potential
to achieve improved nutritional outcomes by leveraging market-
based systems (Gelli et al., 2015).
Using a sample of 1,200 households and which covers more than ten con-
tracted crops across six regions of Madagascar, we look at whether participa-
tion in contract farming appears to decrease the length of the hungry season
experienced by households. Because a households decision to participate
in contract farming is likely to be jointly determined with the duration of
the hungry season experienced by the same household, we use the results of
a eld experiment aimed at eliciting respondent willingness to pay (WTP)
to participate in contract farming. We then use this WTP variable to help
disentangle the potential causal relationship owing from participation in
contract farming to the duration of the hungry season from the correlation
2The contracts we study in this paper take place during the main agricultural season
in Madagascar. Consequently, it is always the case in the data that people get paid for
their contracted crops immediately after the hungry season ends.
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between the two. We rst use this WTP information in a regression con-
text for a selection-on-observables design (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). We
then use this WTP information to estimate average treatment e¤ects using
propensity score matching methods, since the same assumption which makes
the selection-on-observables design possible also makes the conditional inde-
pendence assumption likely to hold.
Our core results suggest that participation in contract farming decreases
the duration of the hungry season by approximately ten days for the average
household in our data. Hazards and duration model results suggest that
participation in contract farming increases the likelihood that a households
hungry season will end at any given time by about 20 percent. Our propensity
score matching results are largely consistent with our regression results.
In addition, our ndings indicate that the benecial e¤ects of participa-
tion in contract farming are more pronounced (i) the greater the number of
children, and (ii) the greater the number of female children in a participant
household. This is important because childrenespecially girlsare often the
ones who bear the burden of food insecurity given unequal intrahousehold
allocations of food, calories, and nutrients (Barrett, 2002). Longer hungry
seasonsour measure of food insecuritycan cause wasting, stunting, and a
number of other health problems, and children who go hungry during their
developmental process are more likely to have worse educational and health
outcomes later on in life (Alderman et al., 2006; Ruel and Alderman, 2013).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss our
empirical framework and present the details of our estimation and identica-
tion strategies. Section 3 presents the data and some descriptive statistics. In
section 4, we present and discuss our empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Framework
This section rst presents the estimation strategy we use in order to study
the impact of participation in contract farming on the duration of the hungry
season dened here as the length of time during which members of the
household go without three meals a day experienced by the households in
our data. Then, because the duration of the hungry season experienced by
a household is likely endogenous to its participation in contract farming, we
explain the details of the identication strategy we rely on in this paper.
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2.1 Estimation Strategy
2.1.1 Ordinary Least Squares and Duration Models
The core equation we estimate in this paper is
yi = 1 + 1xi + 1Di + i, (1)
where yi  0 is the duration of the hungry season experienced by house-
hold imeasured in months, xi is a vector of control variables,
3 Di is a variable
equal to one if household i participates in contract farming and equal to zero
otherwise, and i is an error term with mean zero.
We are primarily interested in the coe¢ cient  which, ifD were exogenous
to y, would be the average treatment e¤ect (ATE) of participating in contract
farming on the duration of the hungry season, or
 = E(yijDi = 1)  E(yijDi = 0). (2)
However, D is endogenous to y because households participation in con-
tract farming is not assigned at random. Therefore, we estimate the following
version of equation 1:
yi = 2 + 2xi + 2Di + 2wi + i, (3)
where i is an error term with mean zero, and wi is a vector of dummy
variables that capture our respondentsanswers to an experimental question
aimed at eliciting WTP to participate in a hypothetical contract farming
agreement. Our claim is that this WTP proxies for each respondents mar-
ginal utility of participating in contract farming, which in turn controls for a
number of unobservable characteristics which explain selection into contract
farming. We thus attempt to identify the ATE of participating in contract
farming on the duration of the hungry season using a selection-on-observables
design, in which a coe¢ cient is identied because the RHS variables (here,
x and w) account for selection into a given treatment (here, D). We further
elaborate this identication strategy in section 2.2.
Because we are dealing with duration datathat is, the LHS variable
measures the number of months a households last hungry season lastedwe
use three distinct estimators to estimate equation 3. The rst is the ordinary
least squares estimator, wherein  tells us how much shorter the hungry
3Underlines are used throughout this paper to denote vectors.
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season is, on average, for households that participate in contract farming.
The next two estimators are the Cox proportional hazards model and the
survival time regression model, two workhorse estimators used in the study
of duration data (Lancaster, 1986).4 In these two models,  tells us how
likely a household is to exitthe condition represented by the hungry season
at any given point in time. Thus, if participation in contract farming has
the hypothesized benecial e¤ects on food security, we would expect  < 0
in the OLS specications (i.e., contract farming is associated with shorter
hungry seasons), and  > 0 in the Cox proportional hazards and survival
time regression models (i.e., contract farming is associated with a higher
likelihood of exiting the hungry season at any point in time).
2.1.2 Propensity Score Matching
Propensity score matching (PSM) is a valuable estimation strategy in the
case of selection on observables (Imbens, 2015). Therefore, we use PSM as
an additional estimator in this analysis. In the rst stage, we estimate a
probit model that is such that
Di = + xi + wi + i, (4)
where the variables are labeled the same as in equation 3.
The parameters of this model are then used to estimate the propensity
score for each individual. The propensity score is an estimate of each house-
holds likelihood of participation in contract farming, given their observable
characteristics and their response to the contingent valuation question.
We then match households that participate in contract farming to house-
holds that do not participate in contract farming but have a similar propen-
sity score. In selecting a matching algorithm it is important to consider two
things. The rst is the number of non-participating households to match to
participating households. Matching only one household raises the likelihood
that the two matched households are very similar. Increasing the number of
matched households can decrease the similarity between matched households
but increase the pool of households upon which we draw inferences. The sec-
ond important consideration is the caliper size. The caliper size determines
4The survival time regression requires that one make an assumption on the distribution
of the survival function. We make the common assumption that the survival function
follows a Weibull distribution.
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how similar two householdspropensity scores must be in order for the corre-
sponding households to be matched. If the caliper size is large, it is possible
to match households with very dissimilar propensity scores. If the caliper
is very small, it becomes di¢ cult to nd suitable matches, and thus a large
portion of observations will be dropped from the sample, and the standard
errors become inated.
To address these trade-o¤s we use three matching routines to match
households: (i) one nearest neighbor with a caliper size of 0.01 standard
deviations, (ii) three nearest neighbors with a caliper size of 0.01 standard
deviations, and (iii) three nearest neighbors with a caliper size of 0.001 stan-
dard deviations. We then estimate three treatment e¤ects: (i) the average
treatment e¤ect on the treated (ATT), (ii) the average treatment e¤ect on
the untreated (ATU), and (iii) the average treatment e¤ect (ATE). The ATT
is standard reporting for propensity score matching and tells us how treated
households are a¤ected by participation in contract farming. The ATE is
the same estimator that is reported in our OLS estimates, and is thus of the
most interest. This estimator tells us how the whole sample is and would be
a¤ected by participation in contract farming. One would expect the ATT to
be the largest, in absolute value, followed by the ATE, and the ATU should
be the smallest, in absolute value, since those who are likely to benet the
most from contract farming are more likely to select into participating.
Because the standard errors estimated in matching routines do not ac-
count for the fact that the propensity score is estimated, we use the standard
error correction from Abadie and Imbens (2006), using the three nearest
neighbors to calculate the conditional variance.
2.2 Identication Strategy
As discussed, we rely on a selection-on-observables identication strategy
in order to estimate the impact of participation in contract farming on the
duration of the hungry season. This section rst explains the experimental
setup that we used to elicit WTP for contract farming. It then explains how
WTP for contract farming should purge the error term, , of much of its
correlation with the variables on the RHS of equation 3.
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2.2.1 Experimental Setup
The contingent valuation experiment used in this paper is the same as that
used in Bellemare (2012). Each respondent was asked whether he would
participate in a contract farming agreement that would raise his income by
10 percent in exchange for a one-time monetary investment. The amount of
the monetary investment was randomly selected from six investment amounts
of $12.50, $25.00, $37.50, $50.00, $62.50, or $75.00.5 The size of investment
was determined at random by the throw of a regular (i.e., six-sided and
fair) die. For each respondent, the data include the random dollar amount
associated with the roll of the die and a Yesor Noanswer to whether
the respondent would pay an initial investment equal to the random dollar
amount in order to participate in a contract farming agreement that would
increase his income by 10 percent.
The vector w in equation 3 captures respondent answers to the contingent
valuation experiment. For example, a respondent who rolls a ve on the die
throw would be asked whether hed like to participate in a contract farming
agreement that would raise his income by 10 percent, but would require him
to pay an initial investment of $62.50. If he answered Yes,his w vector
would be equal to (w1; w2; w3; w4; w5; w6) = (0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 0). A respondent
who rolls a four on the die throw would be asked whether hed like to par-
ticipate in a contract farming agreement that would raise his income by 10
percent, but would cost $50.00. If he answered No,his w vector would be
equal to (0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0).
The foregoing ascribes a No answer to all questions that a respon-
dent was not asked. In the example above, in which the respondent is asked
whether he would participate in a contract farming agreement costing $62.50,
we have coded all other amounts, $12.50, $25.00, $37.50, $50.00, and $75.00,
as No.A clear shortcoming of that approach is that it treats the unasked
questions as having been answered in the negative. To remedy that, in a
second set of estimations, we impute, on the basis of observables, what each
respondents answers would be to all investment questions. So a respon-
dent who rolls a ve on the die throw and responds Yes,meaning that he
would like to participate in a contract farming agreement that would raise
his income by 10 percent, but would require him to pay an initial cost of
5Those gures are presented in US dollars for ease of exposition. The US-dollar gures
were expressed in local currency during eldwork so respondents could more easily relate
to the amounts.
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$62.50, would have a w vector equal to ( bw1; bw2; bw3; bw4; 1; bw6) where bwi de-
notes an imputed value in the ith position. Because the level of investment
required of each respondent (i.e., $12.50, $25.00, $37.50, $50.00, $62.50, or
$75.00) was determined at random as part of the experiment, the level of
investment is unrelated to a respondents observable and unobservable char-
acteristics, which means that the imputed responses to the unasked questions
are unbiased. The shortcoming of this approach is that it relies on generated
regressors. We deal with this by bootstrapping standard errors.
Lastly, in a third set of estimations, we enforce monotonic switching on
the part of our respondents. That is, if a respondent answers Yesto partic-
ipating in the hypothetical contract farming agreement for a given randomly
selected investment value, we code all lower investment values as Yesan-
swers as well. In doing this, we assume that someone who would be willing
to pay, say, $62.50 for a contract that would increase his income by 10 per-
cent would also be willing to pay $12.50, $25.00, $37.50, or $50.00 for the
same contract. So a respondent who rolls a ve on the die throw and states
that Yes,he would like to participate in a contract farming agreement that
would raise his income by 10 percent, but would require him to pay an initial
cost of $62.50, would have a w vector equal to (1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 0).
In all cases, the identifying assumption we make is that a respondents
response to the contingent valuation question is correlated with his WTP
to participate in contract farming, and so the vector w serves as a proxy
for a respondents marginal utility from participating in contract farming.
The next section explains why this constitutes a selection-on-observables re-
search design in the context of regression or, alternatively why it satises the
conditional independence assumption in the context of matching.
2.2.2 Identication
How does a set of proxies for a respondents marginal utility from partici-
pating in contract farming help identify the causal impact of participation
in contract farming on the duration of the hungry season? Recall that there
are three sources of statistical endogeneity:
1. Unobserved heterogeneity,
2. Reverse causality, and
3. Measurement error.
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We look at each of these in turn in the remainder of this section.
Unobserved heterogeneity refers to the problem of omitted variables such
as a respondents preferences for risk and ambiguity, his entrepreneurial abil-
ity, his technical ability, and his preferences in general, all of which can
compromise the identication the ATE if they happen to be correlated with
both the duration of the hungry season and any of the variables on the RHS
of equation 1. In this application, a great deal of this unobserved hetero-
geneity can be captured by di¤erences in a respondents marginal utility
from contract farming. Take for example a respondent who is price risk
averse (Bellemare et al., 2013). Such a respondent might prefer to partic-
ipate in contract farming because contract farming arrangements typically
insure growers against price risk. Alternatively, a respondent who is very
entrepreneurial might have little to no use for contract farming given that
she has her own micro-enterprise. Such a respondent might prefer not to
participate in contract farming because of the opportunity cost of time as-
sociated with being in a grower-processor contract. In all such cases where
a respondents marginal utility from participating in contract farming varies
because of some omitted variable, the variation in WTP measure captures
the variation in respondent marginal utility, which should largely obviate
concerns about unobserved heterogeneity between respondents.
Reverse causality refers to the statistical endogeneity problem that arises
from the fact that the dependent variable might cause the variable of interest.
In this case, households that experience a shorter hungry season may be
more likely to participate in contract farming. This would compromise the
identication of the ATE. This could denitely be a concern in our application
given that households that have better access to food may be more willing to
enter into contract farming agreements. It should be the case, however, that
a respondent who is more willing to enter into a contract farming agreement
will have a higher marginal utility of participating in contract farming. Our
WTPmeasure controls for this issue much the same as it did for other changes
in preferences, which should obviate concerns about reverse causality.
Finally, measurement error refers to the statistical endogeneity problem
that arises from there being measurement error in whether a household par-
ticipates in contract farming. This is highly unlikely to be a problem in
our application given that there is no obvious advantage or disadvantage to
misreporting whether one participates in contract farming or not. In addi-
tion, the sample was choice-based, i.e., the survey team aimed for a sample
in which half the respondents participated in contract farming and half did
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not, and the survey frame was established with village chiefs, who know who
participated in contract farming and who did not. This sampling strategy
thus served as a consistency check for whether people truly did participate
in contract farming.
In sum, our identication strategy allows us to rule out a number of
sources of bias which plague the identication of a causal e¤ect in this con-
text. Because we are dealing with observational data, however, it is impos-
sible to rule out all sources of statistical endogeneity with certainty. As a
result, we caution the reader against interpreting our estimate of  as causal,
although it can certainly be interpreted as suggestive of the e¤ect of partici-
pation in contract farming on the duration of the hungry season experienced
by grower households.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data used in this paper are the same as in Bellemare (2012), and this
section necessarily echoes the discussion of the same data in that paper.
The data were collected between July and December of 2008 for a study
of contract farming commissioned by the World Bank. The data cover six
regions and two communes per region. Three of these regions were cho-
sen because they exhibited a relatively high prevalence of contract farming;
the other three were chosen because the government of Madagascar viewed
them as high-priority areas for economic development. In all regions, the
two communes with the highest density of contract farming were surveyed.
Commune-level data were obtained from the 2007 census of communes in
Madagascar. Moser (2008) presents the methodology used for the commune
census.
Within each of the 12 communes, two lists were generated: one a list of all
households that participated in contract farming, the other a list of all house-
holds that did not. Then, 50 households were randomly selected from the list
of households that participated in contract farming, and 50 were randomly
selected from the list of households that did not. We use sampling weights
throughout this paper to account for this choice-based sampling (Manski
and Lerman, 1977), and to bring our sample as close as possible to a random
sample.
The survey was conducted in rural areas of Madagascar, and thus the
vast majority96 percentof the households in our sample derive at least
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some of their income from agricultural activities. For each household, data
were collected at the household, plot, crop, and contract level.
We present descriptive statistics for our sample in Table 1. The aver-
age duration of the hungry seasonthe length of time during which members
of the household go without three meals per day, i.e., our proxy for food
insecurityfor the households in our sample is 3.5 months. Approximately
half of the surveyed households participate in contract farming. The average
household has between ve and six members, and almost half of the indi-
viduals in any given household are dependents, i.e., they are either younger
than 15 or older than 65. The average household head is married and male,
is 43 years old, has almost six years of education, and has over 20 years of
agricultural experience. More than 20 percent of household heads are mem-
bers of a farm organization other than a contract farming organization, and
the average household head is forbidden from doing agriculture work for 22
days per year for religious reasons.6
Average household annual income is approximately US$968 with an aver-
age per capita income of US$174.7 In Madagascar in 2008, GDP per capita
was US$468, meaning households in our sample were signicantly poorer
than the national average. The average household owns about US$220 of
agricultural equipment and tools, and about US$700 in other assets such as
a house, TV, radio, and livestock. On average, households own 1.45 hectares
of land.
Lastly, Table 1 displays the results of the contingent valuation experiment.
As expected, the proportion of respondents who are willing to participate in
contract farming declines as the investment required grows, except for an
initial bump in positive responses between the $12.50 and $25 investments.
4 Empirical Results
We begin this section by presenting nonparametric evidence of the relation-
ship between participation in contract farming and duration of the hungry
6The Malagasy observe a system of taboos and interdictions which dictate everything
from the orientation of buildings to what a person may eat. Those taboos tend to vary
at several levels, between individuals, households, villages, ethnic groups, and so on. See
Ruud (1960) for a thorough treatment, and Stifel et al. (2007) for an investigation of the
e¤ects of days on which agricultural work is forbidden on agricultural productivity.
7USD 1  2,000 Ariary at the time the data were collected.
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season experienced by households. This nonparametric relationship does not
account for confounding factors in the decision to participate in contract
farming, it merely displays the relationship between contract farming and
the duration of the hungry season. Thus, we then present parametric evi-
dence using the selection-on-observables regression methodology discussed in
Section 2 as well as propensity score matching methods. We then look at
treatment heterogeneity, rst by determining whether the e¤ects of participa-
tion in contract farming on food security are more pronounced for households
with more children, and second by looking at whether the e¤ects of participa-
tion in contract farming on food security are more pronounced for households
with more girls. We then discuss the results of a number of robustness checks,
and conclude this section by discussing the limitations of our approach.
4.1 Nonparametric Evidence
We begin with nonparametric estimations of the relationship between con-
tract farming and the duration of the hungry season in order to establish
whether a relationship exists between participation in contract farming and
food security. Kaplan-Meier (i.e., nonparametric) estimates of the survival
functions for households that participate in contract farming and households
that do not are displayed in Figure 1. These estimates show that contract
farming participants are more likely to exit the hungry season earlier than
non-participants.
Similarly, Figure 2 displays kernel density estimates of the distribution of
the number of days spent in the hungry season for households that participate
in contract farming and households that do not. Households that participate
in contract farming experience a shorter hungry season than those that do
not participate.
Both gures suggest there is a relationship between a household partici-
pating in contract farming and the length of the hungry season experienced
by that same household, but neither gure can help ascertain whether that
relationship is causal. In order to disentangle the potential causal relation-
ship between contract farming and food security, we now turn to parametric
evidence.
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4.2 Parametric Evidence
We now estimate the relationship between participation in contract farming
and duration of the hungry season using the estimation and identication
strategies discussed in Section 2. We account for the endogenous choice to
participate in contract farming or not by using proxy variables for respon-
dentsmarginal utility. This proxy is derived from the contingent valuation
eld experiment to elicited willingness to pay to participate in contract farm-
ing described above.
4.2.1 Ordinary Least Squares and Duration Models
Table 2 presents ordinary least squares (OLS), Cox proportional hazards,
and survival time regression estimation results. Assuming that a month lasts
30 days on average, the OLS results suggest that participating in contract
farming is associated with a nine-day decrease (-0.277  30) in the duration
of the hungry season. Similarly, the Cox proportional hazards and survival
time regression estimation results respectively suggest that a household that
participates in contract farming is 17 and 19 percent more likely to exit the
hungry season at any given time than a household that does not participate
in contract farming. Additionally, female-headed households experience a
hungry season that is about three weeks (0.73  30) longer than male-headed
households and are 32 percent less likely to exit the hungry season at any
given time, according to the Cox proportional hazards model, and 39 percent
less likely, according to the survival time regression. Likewise, increases in a
household heads years of education and his years of agricultural experience
as well as the value of the assets owned by his household are all associated
with shorter hungry seasons and a greater likelihood of exiting the hungry
season at any given time. Lastly, though the contingent-valuation dummies
are not individually signicant in any of the models presented in Table 2, they
are jointly signicant at less than the 10 percent level for the OLS model.
4.2.2 Treatment Heterogeneity
We now turn to treatment heterogeneity by number of children and by num-
ber of children of each gender in the household. Table 3 shows estimation
results for OLS, Cox proportional hazards, and survival time regression mod-
els in which the treatment variable (i.e., the dummy for whether a household
participates in contract farming) is interacted with the number of children
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in the household. Similarly, Table 4 shows estimation results for OLS, Cox
proportional hazards, and survival time regression models in which the treat-
ment variable (i.e., the dummy for whether a household participates in con-
tract farming) is interacted with the number of children of each gender in
the household.
The results in Table 3 show that participation in contract farming is
associated with greater decreases in the duration of the hungry season the
more children there are in the household. Specically, for every child in the
household, the duration of the hungry season decreases by about six days
(-0.19  30) in households that participate in contract farming, and the
likelihood that the household will exit the hungry season increases by 6 and
7 percent, according to the Cox proportional hazards and the survival time
regression model, respectively.
Likewise, the results in Table 4 show that participation in contract farm-
ing is associated with greater decreases in the duration of the hungry season
the more girls there are in the household. Specically, for every girl in the
household, the duration of the hungry season decreases by about one week (-
0.22  30), and the likelihood that the household will exit the hungry season
increases by 12 and 14 percent, according to the Cox proportional hazards
and the survival time regression model, respectively.
What could account for this apparent treatment heterogeneity? In other
words, why would the benecial e¤ects of participation in contract farming
be more pronounced for households with more children, and specically for
households with more female children? Though our data do not allow deter-
mining the precise mechanism behind these ndings, it is not unlikely that
because childrenspecically girlsrequire fewer calories, we may see that the
addition of calories in the household creates a larger reduction in the num-
ber of skipped meals for households with more children. Additionally, it is
possible that because childrenespecially girlsare often neglected when it
comes to nutrition within the household, they are also the ones for whom
any kind of welfare-increasing treatment such as participation in contract
farming will have the largest positive e¤ects. In other words, the marginal
welfare impacts of participating in contract farming will be highest for chil-
dren, specically girls, and so it is not surprising that the e¤ects of partici-
pation in contract farming on food security would be especially pronounced
for households with more children and with more girls. But given that our
data do not allow studying how many meals each member of the household
consumes, this explanation is necessarily tentative and speculative.
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Lastly, though the contingent-valuation dummies are generally not indi-
vidually signicant in any of the models presented in Tables 3 and 4, they
are jointly signicant at less than the 10 percent level in the OLS models in
both Tables 3 and 4.
4.2.3 Robustness Checks
In order to determine that our results are robust, we estimated a number of
alternative specications. Table 5 presents the results of two estimators that
aim at minimizing the e¤ects of outliers. The rst specication is a median
regression. Intuitively, a median regression is similar to an OLS regression,
except that it focuses on the conditional median rather than the conditional
mean. The second specication is a robust regression (Rousseeuw and Yohai,
1987). In both cases, results are very similar to the core OLS result in the
rst column of table 2.
In appendix Tables A1, A2, and A3, we present estimation results similar
to our core results in Table 2, 3, and 4, respectively, with one di¤erence. In
Tables A1, A2, and A3, the responses to the contingent-valuation questions
that were not posed to the respondent are imputed, as detailed in section 2.
Because imputations yield generated regressors, we bootstrap the standard
errors but omit sampling weights in appendix Tables A1, A2, and A3. Given
the results in appendix Tables A1, A2, and A3, our core results appear to
be robust to a change in how we proxy for respondent marginal utility to
participate in a hypothetical contract farming agreement that would increase
household income by 10 percent. Similarly, when we include sampling weights
but do not bootstrap the standard errors8 in appendix Tables A4, A5, and
A6, our core results appear once again robust to a change in how we proxy for
respondent marginal utility to participate in a hypothetical contract farming
agreement that would increase household income by 10 percent.
Appendix Table A7 presents the results of treatment regressions wherein
responses to the contingent-valuation questions are used as instrumental vari-
ables for participation in contract farming, as in Bellemare (2012). Taking
both the OLS results in table 2 and the treatment regression results in appen-
dix Table A7 at face valuethat is, assuming that they both identify causal
impactswould suggest that the local average treatment e¤ect (LATE, i.e.,
the estimated coe¢ cient on participation in contract farming in either column
8We do not show results in which we use sampling weights and bootstrapped standard
errors, because the use of the latter precludes incorporating the former.
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of appendix Table A7) is much larger than the average treatment e¤ect (ATE,
i.e., the estimated coe¢ cient on participation in contract farming in the rst
column of Table 2). In other words, if one is willing to believe that both
specications are well-specied and identify causal relationships, one would
conclude that participating in contract farming is associated with an almost
two-month decrease in the duration of the hungry season for those households
who were induced to participate because they would derive a higher marginal
utility from participating in the hypothetical contract farming arrangement.
But taking into account the potential e¤ect of participating in contract farm-
ing for everyoneincluding nonparticipantsthe e¤ect is severely moderated.
In other words, the fact that the LATE exceeds the ATE implies that compli-
ers (i.e., those households that participate in contract farming because they
derive higher marginal utility from doing so and those households that do not
participate because they would not derive higher marginal utility from doing
so) derive higher benets than deers (i.e., those households that participate
but derive lower marginal utility from doing so, or households that do not
participate but would derive higher marginal utility from doing so).
Finally, appendix table A8 includes the results for the model in which
we enforce monotonic switching in the set of contingent valuation questions.
This model yields results that are identical to those in Table 2. We thus
conclude from these robustness checks that our core results are robust to
alternative estimators and specications.
4.2.4 Propensity Score Matching
Table 6 displays the results from the probit regression of participation in con-
tract farming on household characteristics and proxy variables for marginal
utility of participation in contract farming. Households with an older house-
hold head are less likely to participate in contract farming than households
with a younger head. Households in which the head is a member of a farm
organization are more likely to participate in contract farming than house-
holds in which the head is not a member of a farm organization. Households
in which the survey respondent answered that he would be willing to pay
the random dollar amount in order to participate in a hypothetical contract
farming agreement are more likely to participate in contract farming than
households in which the respondent answered No.
Figure 3 displays the distribution of the propensity scores by participants
and non-participants in contract farming for the full, untrimmed sample.
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There is a substantial amount of overlap in the propensity scores between
participants and non-participants. This overlap is crucial to estimating reli-
able e¤ects of contract farming. Moreover, tables A9 to A11 present balance
statistics for matched samples in all three of our matching specications.
Table 7 displays the results of the three matching routines for the three
treatment e¤ect estimators and the unmatched sample. These results esti-
mate (i) the e¤ect of participation in contract farming on the length of the
hungry season experienced by the household for households that participated
in contract farming (ATT), (ii) what the e¤ect of participation in contract
farming would have been for households that did not participate in contract
farming (ATU), and (iii) what the e¤ect of participation in contract farm-
ing would have been for all households in the sample (ATE). As expected,
the results for all three matching routines show that the largest e¤ect is for
households that did participate, followed by the e¤ect for all households in
the sample. The smallest estimated e¤ects are for those households that did
not participate. Recall that the estimated ATE is most comparable to the
estimated e¤ects for the OLS results because OLS reports the ATE.
The ATE ranges from -0.127 to -0.272. This represents a reduction in the
length of the hungry season by between four and nine days. The e¤ect for
participating households is larger, i.e., the ATT ranges from -0.194 to -0.305.
This is a reduction in the length of the hungry season by six to ten daysan
e¤ect that is very close to what we nd using in our OLS specication in the
rst column of table 2.
4.3 Limitations
Despite their robustness, our results su¤er from some important limitations in
terms of internal validity, and in terms of the measurement of food insecurity.
In terms of internal validity, it bears iterating that our estimates of the
e¤ect of household participation in contract farming on the duration of the
hungry season experienced by that household is only as good as our identi-
cation strategy. Here, in order to believe that our estimates are causal, one
must trust that our proxies for respondent marginal utility of participation
in contract farming derived from our contingent valuation experiment fully
account for the selection process whereby households choose to participate
in contract farming. This is an assumption that is untestable. Moreover,
comparing the OLS specication in the rst column of table 2 with a similar
specication that omits the dummy variables for the contingent-valuation
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question shows, via a Hausman test, that the coe¢ cients are not statistically
di¤erent between the two models, i.e., we fail to reject the null hypothesis of
the Hausman test. Further, the coe¢ cient on the contract farming dummy
only goes from -0.277 in table 2 to -0.293 in a specication (not shown) that
excludes the contingent valuation dummies.
This suggests one of two things: either (i) the contingent valuation ques-
tions do not do a good job of accounting for selection into contract farming,
or (ii) participation in contract farming is not endogenous to the duration of
the hungry season experienced by households. However unlikely the latter
statement may seem, in an OLS regression (not shown) of contract farm-
ing participation on the right-hand side variables in table 2, a joint signi-
cance test of the contingent valuation dummies shows that those dummies are
jointly signicant at a condence level that exceeds 99 percent. Similarly, the
probit regression results in table 6 show the WTP is highly correlated with
participation in contract farming. In other words, responses to the contin-
gent valuation experiment appear to explain selection into contract farming,
which would invalidate (i) above, leaving us to conclude that (ii) holds.
In terms of measurement of food insecurity, we wish to reiterate we are
only measuring one aspect of food insecurity, viz. the length of time house-
hold members go without eating three meals a day. But food insecurity could
be measured much more precisely by measuring each household members
consumption of calories, macronutrients (e.g., carbohydrates, fat, and pro-
tein), or micronutrients (i.e., specic vitamins and minerals). The data used
in this paper were not collected for the specic purpose of studying food in-
security, and measuring food insecurity accurately would require individual-
rather than household-level survey questionnaires.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have used data on 1,200 households across six regions of Madagascar
to investigate the relationship between contract farming and food security
by looking at whether participation in contract farming is associated with a
decrease in the duration of the hungry season experienced by the households
in our data.
Our results show that participation in contract farming is associated with
a reduction in the duration of the hungry season by about 10 days for the
average household, and that it increases the likelihood that a household will
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exit the hungry season at any point in time by about 20 percent on aver-
age. These are important results because even though published research
has shown that contract farming increases the income of participating farm-
ers (Porter and Phillips-Howard, 1997; Singh, 2002; Warning and Key, 2002;
Simmons, 2005; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Minten et al., 2009; Miyata et
al., 2009; Rao and Qaim, 2011; Bellemare, 2012; Michelson, 2013; Narayanan,
2014), there has so far been no attempt to study whether contract farming
leads to improvements in food security, and the link between agricultural
value chains and nutrition has been deemed a high priority by policy makers
(Gelli et al., 2015; FAO, 2013). Moreover, the estimated e¤ects of participa-
tion in contract farming on the duration of the hungry season experienced
by households are especially pronounced for households with more children,
and for households with more female children. These are important results
given that children, particularly girls, bear the largest burden of food inse-
curity, the consequences of which include stunting, wasting, listlessness, and
cognitive impairment (Alderman et al., 2006; Ruel and Alderman, 2013).
From a behavioral perspective, our results suggest that smallholders in
Madagascar save a portion of the additional income they receive from par-
ticipating in contract farming in order to spend it on food in the months
leading to the harvest. From a policy perspective, this suggest that policies
that facilitate the development of agricultural value chains, beyond their di-
rect welfarist e¤ect on the incomes of those who participate as growers, can
also have indirect nonwelfarist e¤ects on those same growersfood security.
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Figure 1. Kaplan-Meier Estimates of the Effect of Participation in Contract Farming (CF) 
on the Duration of the Hungry Season. 
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Figure 2. Kernel Density Estimates of the Duration of the Hungry Season by Contract 
Farming Participation Status. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of Propensity Scores by Participation Regime. Solid Lines Denote 
Participants in Contract Farming; Dashed Lines Denote Nonparticipants. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean 
  (Std. Err.) 
Duration of Hungry Season (Months) 3.507 
 
(0.076) 
Contract Farming Participant (Dummy) 0.498 
 
(0.016) 
Household Size (Individuals) 5.571 
 
(0.075) 
Dependency Ratio 0.449 
 
(0.008) 
Household Head Single (Dummy) 0.124 
 
(0.011) 
Household Head Female (Dummy) 0.088 
 
(0.010) 
Household Head Migrant (Dummy) 0.125 
 
(0.011) 
Household Head Age (Years) 43.274 
 
(0.431) 
Household Head Education (Years) 5.682 
 
(0.106) 
Household Head Agricultural Experience (Years) 20.621 
 
(0.433) 
Household Head Member of Farm Organization 0.222 
 
(0.014) 
Days Agricultural Work Forbidden (Days/Year) 22.204 
 
(1.105) 
Household Income (100,000 Ariary) 19.531 
 
(1.506) 
Household Working Capital (100,000 Ariary) 4.440 
 
(0.522) 
Household Assets (100,000 Ariary) 13.965 
 
(0.876) 
Household Landholdings (100 Square Meters) 145.569 
 
(10.138) 
"Yes" to $12.50 Investment 0.132 
 
(0.011) 
"Yes" to $25.00 Investment 0.179 
 
(0.013) 
"Yes" to $37.50 Investment 0.157 
 
(0.012) 
"Yes" to $50.00 Investment 0.133 
 
(0.011) 
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"Yes" to $62.50 Investment 0.069 
 
(0.009) 
"Yes" to $75.00 Investment 0.066 
 
(0.008) 
  Observations 1,178 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 2. Estimation Results for OLS, Cox Proportional Hazard, and Survival-Time Regressions. 
Variables OLS Cox Survival Time 
Dependent Variable: Duration of Hungry Season 
Contract Farming Participant -0.277* 0.166*** 0.188*** 
 
(0.145) (0.063) (0.071) 
Household Size  0.052 -0.013 -0.015 
 
(0.036) (0.015) (0.017) 
Dependency Ratio 0.517 -0.226 -0.247 
 
(0.366) (0.158) (0.181) 
Household Head Single  -0.126 0.042 0.068 
 
(0.343) (0.147) (0.167) 
Household Head Female  0.732* -0.323* -0.390* 
 
(0.402) (0.175) (0.202) 
Household Head Migrant  0.064 0.014 0.009 
 
(0.219) (0.101) (0.115) 
Household Head Age  0.021** -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.009) (0.004) (0.005) 
Household Head Education  -0.068*** 0.022** 0.026** 
 
(0.022) (0.010) (0.011) 
Household Head Agricultural Experience  -0.029*** 0.005 0.004 
 
(0.010) (0.004) (0.005) 
Household Head Member of Farm Organization  0.091 -0.095 -0.125 
 
(0.183) (0.088) (0.100) 
Days Agricultural Work Forbidden -0.003 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Household Income  -0.004** 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Household Working Capital  0.002 0.006*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Household Assets  -0.013*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Household Landholdings -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
"Yes" to $12.50 Investment 0.218 -0.033 -0.027 
 
(0.217) (0.095) (0.107) 
"Yes" to $25.00 Investment -0.396* 0.106 0.127 
 
(0.226) (0.091) (0.104) 
"Yes" to $37.50 Investment -0.388* 0.126 0.147 
 
(0.211) (0.097) (0.111) 
"Yes" to $50.00 Investment -0.205 -0.018 -0.017 
 
(0.243) (0.112) (0.128) 
"Yes" to $62.50 Investment -0.142 0.004 0.006 
 
(0.299) (0.136) (0.158) 
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"Yes" to $75.00 Investment 0.151 -0.226 -0.234 
 
(0.342) (0.169) (0.186) 
Constant 3.793*** - -4.152*** 
 
(0.456) 
 
(0.256) 
    Observations 1,178 1,045 1,045 
District Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.206 - - 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3. Estimation Results for OLS, Cox Proportional Hazard, and Survival-Time Regressions Exploring 
Treatment Heterogeneity I. 
Variables OLS Cox Survival Time 
Dependent Variable: Duration of Hungry Season 
Contract Farming Participant 0.210 0.009 0.004 
 
(0.253) (0.109) (0.125) 
Contract Farming Participant x Number of Kids -0.191** 0.060* 0.070* 
 
(0.082) (0.034) (0.039) 
Number of Kids in Household 0.172 -0.053 -0.060 
 
(0.121) (0.050) (0.057) 
Household Size  0.007 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.059) (0.028) (0.032) 
Dependency Ratio 0.255 -0.168 -0.187 
 
(0.583) (0.231) (0.259) 
Household Head Single  -0.164 0.056 0.085 
 
(0.349) (0.150) (0.171) 
Household Head Female  0.765* -0.330* -0.399* 
 
(0.406) (0.176) (0.204) 
Household Head Migrant  0.066 0.006 -0.002 
 
(0.219) (0.102) (0.115) 
Household Head Age  0.024** -0.004 -0.004 
 
(0.010) (0.004) (0.005) 
Household Head Education  -0.068*** 0.022** 0.026** 
 
(0.022) (0.010) (0.012) 
Household Head Agricultural Experience  -0.029*** 0.004 0.003 
 
(0.010) (0.004) (0.005) 
Household Head Member of Farm Organization 0.087 -0.088 -0.115 
 
(0.180) (0.086) (0.097) 
Days Agricultural Work Forbidden  -0.003 0.000 0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Household Income  -0.004** 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Household Working Capital  0.002 0.005*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Household Assets  -0.013*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Household Landholdings  -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
"Yes" to $12.50 Investment 0.197 -0.028 -0.022 
 
(0.217) (0.095) (0.107) 
"Yes" to $25.00 Investment -0.415* 0.107 0.126 
 
(0.227) (0.091) (0.104) 
"Yes" to $37.50 Investment -0.372* 0.124 0.144 
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(0.211) (0.098) (0.112) 
"Yes" to $50.00 Investment -0.196 -0.004 0.000 
 
(0.238) (0.108) (0.124) 
"Yes" to $62.50 Investment -0.142 0.011 0.014 
 
(0.291) (0.136) (0.157) 
"Yes" to $75.00 Investment 0.194 -0.245 -0.258 
 
(0.341) (0.171) (0.188) 
Constant 3.592*** - -4.078*** 
 
(0.487) 
 
(0.271) 
    Observations 1,178 1,045 1,045 
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.213 - - 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Estimation Results for OLS, Cox Proportional Hazard, and Survival-Time Regressions Exploring 
Treatment Heterogeneity II. 
Variables OLS Cox Survival Time 
Dependent Variable: Duration of Hungry Season 
Contract Farming Participant 0.206 -0.005 -0.013 
 
(0.254) (0.109) (0.125) 
Contract Farming Participant x Girls -0.215* 0.118** 0.137** 
 
(0.120) (0.054) (0.061) 
Contract Farming Participant x Boys -0.163 0.015 0.018 
 
(0.120) (0.048) (0.054) 
Number of Girls in the Household 0.214 -0.067 -0.076 
 
(0.133) (0.056) (0.063) 
Number of Boys in the Household 0.129 -0.026 -0.028 
 
(0.141) (0.057) (0.065) 
Household Size  0.007 -0.002 -0.003 
 
(0.059) (0.028) (0.032) 
Dependency Ratio 0.258 -0.196 -0.223 
 
(0.584) (0.231) (0.258) 
Household Head Single  -0.167 0.058 0.088 
 
(0.348) (0.148) (0.169) 
Household Head Female  0.766* -0.336* -0.406** 
 
(0.406) (0.175) (0.202) 
Household Head Migrant  0.061 -0.001 -0.009 
 
(0.221) (0.102) (0.116) 
Household Head Age  0.024** -0.004 -0.004 
 
(0.010) (0.004) (0.005) 
Household Head Education  -0.067*** 0.023** 0.027** 
 
(0.023) (0.010) (0.012) 
Household Head Agricultural Experience  -0.029*** 0.004 0.003 
 
(0.010) (0.004) (0.005) 
Household Head Member of Farm Organization 0.084 -0.096 -0.123 
 
(0.179) (0.086) (0.098) 
Days Agricultural Work Forbidden  -0.003 0.000 0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Household Income  -0.004** 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Household Working Capital  0.002 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Household Assets  -0.013*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Household Landholdings  -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
"Yes" to $12.50 Investment 0.191 -0.025 -0.017 
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(0.216) (0.095) (0.106) 
"Yes" to $25.00 Investment -0.420* 0.104 0.122 
 
(0.226) (0.091) (0.104) 
"Yes" to $37.50 Investment -0.366* 0.122 0.143 
 
(0.212) (0.098) (0.111) 
"Yes" to $50.00 Investment -0.193 -0.015 -0.012 
 
(0.238) (0.108) (0.125) 
"Yes" to $62.50 Investment -0.138 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.290) (0.137) (0.159) 
"Yes" to $75.00 Investment 0.193 -0.250 -0.265 
 
(0.342) (0.171) (0.189) 
Constant 3.586*** - -4.069*** 
 
(0.486) 
 
(0.271) 
    Observations 1,178 1,045 1,045 
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.213 - - 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. Estimation Results for Median and Robust Regressions. 
  (1) (2) 
Variables Median Robust 
Dependent Variable: Duration of Hungry Season 
Contract Farming Participant -0.306** -0.255** 
 
(0.147) (0.121) 
Household Size  0.023 0.040 
 
(0.035) (0.029) 
Dependency Ratio 0.331 0.364 
 
(0.354) (0.291) 
Household Head Single  0.275 0.114 
 
(0.347) (0.285) 
Household Head Female  0.095 0.290 
 
(0.396) (0.326) 
Household Head Migrant  -0.034 0.070 
 
(0.227) (0.187) 
Household Head Age  0.022** 0.024*** 
 
(0.011) (0.009) 
Household Head Education  -0.040* -0.049** 
 
(0.023) (0.019) 
Household Head Agricultural Experience  -0.022** -0.026*** 
 
(0.011) (0.009) 
Household Head Member of Farm Organization -0.092 -0.037 
 
(0.180) (0.148) 
Agricultural Work Forbidden  -0.002 -0.003 
 
(0.003) (0.002) 
Household Income  -0.008*** -0.006*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Household Working Capital  0.002 0.002 
 
(0.004) (0.003) 
Household Assets  -0.011*** -0.012*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) 
Household Landholdings  0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
"Yes" to $12.50 Investment 0.217 0.191 
 
(0.246) (0.202) 
"Yes" to $25.00 Investment -0.489** -0.419** 
 
(0.229) (0.188) 
"Yes" to $37.50 Investment -0.248 -0.269 
 
(0.231) (0.190) 
"Yes" to $50.00 Investment -0.480** -0.356* 
 
(0.242) (0.199) 
"Yes" to $62.50 Investment -0.158 -0.185 
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(0.313) (0.257) 
"Yes" to $75.00 Investment -0.285 -0.191 
 
(0.298) (0.245) 
Constant 3.999*** 3.751*** 
 
(0.472) (0.388) 
   Observations 1,178 1,178 
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
R-squared - 0.200 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6. Probit Regression Results for Propensity Score Estimation 
Variables Probit 
Dependent Variable: Contract Farming Participant 
Household Size 0.013 
 
(0.019) 
Dependency Ratio -0.019 
 
(0.191) 
Household Head is Single -0.162 
 
(0.188) 
Household Head is Female -0.189 
 
(0.217) 
Household Head is Migrant 0.040 
 
(0.123) 
Household Head Age -0.014** 
 
(0.006) 
Household Head Education -0.015 
 
(0.013) 
Household Head Agricultural Experience 0.008 
 
(0.006) 
Household Head Member of Farm Organization 0.472*** 
 
(0.097) 
Days Agricultural Work is Forbidden -0.002 
 
(0.001) 
Household Income 0.002 
 
(0.002) 
Household Working Capital 0.004 
 
(0.004) 
Household Assets 0.001 
 
(0.002) 
Household Landholdings 0.000* 
 
(0.000) 
Yes to $12.50 Investment 0.299** 
 
(0.131) 
Yes to $25.00 Investment 0.433*** 
 
(0.122) 
Yes to $37.50 Investment 0.434*** 
 
(0.123) 
Yes to $50.00 Investment 0.596*** 
 
(0.129) 
Yes to $62.50 Investment 0.372** 
 
(0.167) 
Yes to $75.00 Investment 0.569*** 
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(0.158) 
Constant 0.131 
 
(0.247) 
  Observations 1,178 
District Dummies Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.069 
Log Likelihood -760.359 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. Outcome Variable: Duration of Hungry Season 
  1 Neighbor  3 Neighbors  3 Neighbors  
Sample Caliper 0.01 Caliper 0.01 Caliper 0.001 
Unmatched Sample -0.400*** -0.400*** -0.400*** 
 
(0.123) (0.123) (0.123) 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated -0.194 -0.305 -0.295 
 
(0.234) (0.223) (0.255) 
Average Treatment Effect on the Untreated -0.062 -0.204 -0.249 
 
(0.225)  (0.207) (0.269) 
Average Treatment Effect -0.127 -0.252 -0.272 
  (0.204)  (0.196) (0.241) 
Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors calculated using three neighbors to calculate 
conditional variance as in Abadie and Imbens (2006). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Estimation Results for OLS, Cox Proportional Hazard, and Survival-Time Regressions. Missing 
Contingent Valuation Responses Imputed; No Sampling Weights, Bootstrapped Standard Errors. 
Variables OLS Cox Survival Time 
Dependent Variable: Duration of Hungry Season 
Contract Farming Participant -0.296** 0.118** 0.133* 
 
(0.124) (0.060) (0.070) 
Household Size  0.048 -0.017 -0.020 
 
(0.033) (0.017) (0.020) 
Dependency Ratio 0.270 0.048 0.071 
 
(0.346) (0.176) (0.211) 
Household Head Single  -0.029 -0.029 -0.010 
 
(0.302) (0.140) (0.169) 
Household Head Female  0.348 -0.140 -0.180 
 
(0.347) (0.176) (0.217) 
Household Head Migrant  0.201 -0.033 -0.050 
 
(0.217) (0.116) (0.138) 
Household Head Age  0.008 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.013) (0.006) (0.008) 
Household Head Education  -0.057*** 0.013 0.015 
 
(0.021) (0.011) (0.013) 
Household Head Agricultural Experience  -0.014 0.002 0.001 
 
(0.013) (0.006) (0.007) 
Household Head Member of Farm Organization 0.055 -0.113 -0.153 
 
(0.160) (0.089) (0.105) 
Agricultural Work Forbidden  0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Household Income  -0.005* 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Household Working Capital  -0.003 0.007** 0.008** 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Household Assets  -0.013*** 0.004** 0.005** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Household Landholdings  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
"Yes" to $12.50 Investment (Imputed) -0.347 0.100 0.090 
 
(0.302) (0.158) (0.191) 
"Yes" to $25.00 Investment (Imputed) -0.206 0.047 0.044 
 
(0.344) (0.172) (0.199) 
"Yes" to $37.50 Investment (Imputed) -0.206 -0.070 -0.106 
 
(0.300) (0.136) (0.165) 
"Yes" to $50.00 Investment (Imputed) 0.140 0.191 0.230 
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(0.351) (0.196) (0.229) 
"Yes" to $62.50 Investment (Imputed) -0.734 0.265 0.327 
 
(0.500) (0.240) (0.279) 
"Yes" to $75.00 Investment (Imputed) -0.117 -0.119 -0.138 
 
(0.322) (0.170) (0.199) 
Constant 5.281*** - -4.328*** 
 
(1.041) 
 
(0.627) 
    Observations 1,178 1,045 1,045 
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.196 - - 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2. Estimation Results for OLS, Cox Proportional Hazard, and Survival-Time Regressions 
Exploring Treatment Heterogeneity I. Missing Contingent Valuation Responses Imputed; No Sampling 
Weights, Bootstrapped Standard Errors. 
Variables OLS Cox Survival Time 
Dependent Variable: Duration of Hungry Season 
Contract Farming Participant 0.044 -0.050 -0.064 
 
(0.219) (0.104) (0.126) 
Contract Farming Participant x Number of Kids -0.132* 0.064* 0.075* 
 
(0.070) (0.034) (0.041) 
Number of Kids in Household 0.127 -0.096** -0.118** 
 
(0.102) (0.047) (0.055) 
Household Size  0.015 0.019 0.027 
 
(0.056) (0.029) (0.034) 
Dependency Ratio 0.026 0.277 0.356 
 
(0.506) (0.235) (0.276) 
Household Head Single  -0.034 -0.017 0.008 
 
(0.307) (0.139) (0.169) 
Household Head Female  0.349 -0.129 -0.167 
 
(0.349) (0.175) (0.216) 
Household Head Migrant  0.191 -0.037 -0.055 
 
(0.218) (0.116) (0.138) 
Household Head Age  0.010 -0.004 -0.003 
 
(0.013) (0.006) (0.008) 
Household Head Education  -0.057*** 0.014 0.016 
 
(0.021) (0.011) (0.013) 
Household Head Agricultural Experience  -0.014 0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.013) (0.006) (0.007) 
Household Head Member of Farm Organization 0.047 -0.104 -0.139 
 
(0.160) (0.088) (0.104) 
Agricultural Work Forbidden  0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Household Income  -0.005* 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Household Working Capital  -0.003 0.006** 0.008** 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Household Assets  -0.013*** 0.004** 0.005** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Household Landholdings  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
"Yes" to $12.50 Investment (Imputed) -0.385 0.128 0.126 
 
(0.306) (0.161) (0.195) 
"Yes" to $25.00 Investment (Imputed) -0.242 0.066 0.063 
 
(0.343) (0.174) (0.201) 
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"Yes" to $37.50 Investment (Imputed) -0.194 -0.075 -0.111 
 
(0.304) (0.138) (0.166) 
"Yes" to $50.00 Investment (Imputed) 0.142 0.205 0.250 
 
(0.347) (0.193) (0.225) 
"Yes" to $62.50 Investment (Imputed) -0.725 0.288 0.360 
 
(0.496) (0.241) (0.281) 
"Yes" to $75.00 Investment (Imputed) -0.086 -0.162 -0.194 
 
(0.318) (0.169) (0.198) 
Constant 5.188*** - -4.410*** 
 
(1.040) 
 
(0.633) 
    Observations 1,178 1,045 1,045 
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.199 - - 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A3. Estimation Results for OLS, Cox Proportional Hazard, and Survival-Time Regressions 
Exploring Treatment Heterogeneity II. Missing Contingent Valuation Responses Imputed; No Sampling 
Weights, Bootstrapped Standard Errors. 
Variables OLS Cox Survival Time 
Dependent Variable: Duration of Hungry Season 
Contract Farming Participant 0.048 -0.060 -0.074 
 
(0.218) (0.107) (0.129) 
Contract Farming Participant x Girls -0.167* 0.096* 0.106 
 
(0.101) (0.058) (0.069) 
Contract Farming Participant x Boys -0.101 0.043 0.054 
 
(0.100) (0.049) (0.058) 
Number of Girls in the Household 0.136 -0.091* -0.112* 
 
(0.115) (0.054) (0.062) 
Number of Boys in the Household 0.112 -0.092* -0.114* 
 
(0.115) (0.055) (0.064) 
Household Size  0.017 0.015 0.023 
 
(0.056) (0.029) (0.034) 
Dependency Ratio 0.036 0.256 0.333 
 
(0.505) (0.238) (0.280) 
Household Head Single  -0.034 -0.019 0.006 
 
(0.308) (0.141) (0.171) 
Household Head Female  0.348 -0.126 -0.164 
 
(0.350) (0.177) (0.219) 
Household Head Migrant  0.193 -0.035 -0.052 
 
(0.218) (0.117) (0.138) 
Household Head Age  0.010 -0.004 -0.003 
 
(0.013) (0.006) (0.008) 
Household Head Education  -0.057*** 0.014 0.017 
 
(0.021) (0.011) (0.013) 
Household Head Agricultural Experience  -0.014 0.001 -0.000 
 
(0.013) (0.006) (0.007) 
Household Head Member of Farm Organization 0.045 -0.109 -0.145 
 
(0.160) (0.088) (0.104) 
Agricultural Work Forbidden  0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Household Income  -0.005* 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Household Working Capital  -0.003 0.006** 0.007** 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Household Assets  -0.013*** 0.004** 0.005** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Household Landholdings  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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"Yes" to $12.50 Investment (Imputed) -0.386 0.133 0.133 
 
(0.307) (0.159) (0.192) 
"Yes" to $25.00 Investment (Imputed) -0.246 0.067 0.064 
 
(0.344) (0.175) (0.203) 
"Yes" to $37.50 Investment (Imputed) -0.196 -0.069 -0.104 
 
(0.304) (0.141) (0.171) 
"Yes" to $50.00 Investment (Imputed) 0.144 0.209 0.255 
 
(0.345) (0.194) (0.226) 
"Yes" to $62.50 Investment (Imputed) -0.720 0.266 0.337 
 
(0.494) (0.241) (0.281) 
"Yes" to $75.00 Investment (Imputed) -0.085 -0.166 -0.198 
 
(0.319) (0.170) (0.200) 
Constant 5.183*** - -4.396*** 
 
(1.041) 
 
(0.636) 
    Observations 1,178 1,045 1,045 
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.199 - - 
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A4. Estimation Results for OLS, Cox Proportional Hazard, and Survival-Time Regressions. Missing 
Contingent Valuation Responses Imputed; with Sampling Weights. 
Variables OLS Cox Survival Time 
Dependent Variable: Duration of Hungry Season 
Contract Farming Participant -0.275* 0.151** 0.171** 
 
(0.145) (0.063) (0.071) 
Household Size  0.046 -0.005 -0.006 
 
(0.039) (0.018) (0.020) 
Dependency Ratio 0.498 -0.242 -0.268 
 
(0.428) (0.193) (0.222) 
Household Head Single  -0.224 0.034 0.065 
 
(0.343) (0.151) (0.173) 
Household Head Female  0.799* -0.263 -0.331 
 
(0.412) (0.188) (0.220) 
Household Head Migrant  0.134 0.058 0.051 
 
(0.254) (0.120) (0.137) 
Household Head Age  -0.003 0.004 0.005 
 
(0.014) (0.006) (0.007) 
Household Head Education  -0.077*** 0.021** 0.025** 
 
(0.024) (0.011) (0.012) 
Household Head Agricultural Experience  -0.008 -0.003 -0.005 
 
(0.014) (0.006) (0.007) 
Household Head Member of Farm Organization 0.049 -0.118 -0.157 
 
(0.191) (0.094) (0.108) 
Agricultural Work Forbidden  0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Household Income  -0.003 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Household Working Capital  -0.008 0.009*** 0.011*** 
 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.003) 
Household Assets  -0.017*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Household Landholdings  0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
"Yes" to $12.50 Investment (Imputed) -0.369 0.094 0.103 
 
(0.398) (0.173) (0.197) 
"Yes" to $25.00 Investment (Imputed) -0.341 0.048 0.041 
 
(0.419) (0.187) (0.209) 
"Yes" to $37.50 Investment (Imputed) -0.349 -0.016 -0.012 
 
(0.322) (0.156) (0.183) 
"Yes" to $50.00 Investment (Imputed) 0.546 -0.076 -0.079 
 
(0.405) (0.186) (0.212) 
"Yes" to $62.50 Investment (Imputed) -1.171** 0.385* 0.440* 
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(0.505) (0.214) (0.239) 
"Yes" to $75.00 Investment (Imputed) 0.021 -0.253 -0.267 
 
(0.416) (0.192) (0.217) 
Constant 5.876*** - -4.528*** 
 
(1.150) 
 
(0.596) 
    Observations 1,178 1,045 1,045 
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.205 - - 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A5. Estimation Results for OLS, Cox Proportional Hazard, and Survival-Time Regressions 
Exploring Treatment Heterogeneity I. Missing Contingent Valuation Responses Imputed; with 
Sampling Weights. 
Variables OLS Cox Survival Time 
Dependent Variable: Duration of Hungry Season 
Contract Farming Participant 0.217 -0.010 -0.020 
 
(0.254) (0.109) (0.125) 
Contract Farming Participant x Number of Kids -0.193** 0.061* 0.073* 
 
(0.081) (0.035) (0.039) 
Number of Kids in Household 0.172 -0.066 -0.077 
 
(0.117) (0.049) (0.056) 
Household Size  0.003 0.016 0.019 
 
(0.062) (0.029) (0.033) 
Dependency Ratio 0.220 -0.124 -0.133 
 
(0.602) (0.255) (0.288) 
Household Head Single  -0.248 0.041 0.074 
 
(0.349) (0.154) (0.176) 
Household Head Female  0.809* -0.251 -0.315 
 
(0.414) (0.190) (0.222) 
Household Head Migrant  0.121 0.054 0.044 
 
(0.255) (0.122) (0.138) 
Household Head Age  0.000 0.003 0.004 
 
(0.014) (0.006) (0.007) 
Household Head Education  -0.076*** 0.021* 0.025** 
 
(0.024) (0.011) (0.012) 
Household Head Agricultural Experience  -0.009 -0.004 -0.006 
 
(0.014) (0.006) (0.007) 
Household Head Member of Farm Organization 0.043 -0.110 -0.146 
 
(0.189) (0.092) (0.106) 
Agricultural Work Forbidden  0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Household Income  -0.003 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Household Working Capital  -0.008 0.008*** 0.010*** 
 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
Household Assets  -0.016*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Household Landholdings  0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
"Yes" to $12.50 Investment (Imputed) -0.420 0.126 0.144 
 
(0.409) (0.179) (0.203) 
"Yes" to $25.00 Investment (Imputed) -0.400 0.069 0.063 
 
(0.417) (0.187) (0.208) 
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"Yes" to $37.50 Investment (Imputed) -0.297 -0.033 -0.032 
 
(0.325) (0.159) (0.187) 
"Yes" to $50.00 Investment (Imputed) 0.540 -0.059 -0.058 
 
(0.399) (0.181) (0.205) 
"Yes" to $62.50 Investment (Imputed) -1.150** 0.402* 0.463* 
 
(0.499) (0.216) (0.242) 
"Yes" to $75.00 Investment (Imputed) 0.086 -0.293 -0.317 
 
(0.407) (0.193) (0.219) 
Constant 5.628*** - -4.517*** 
 
(1.146) 
 
(0.606) 
    Observations 1,178 1,045 1,045 
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.211 - - 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A6. Estimation Results for OLS, Cox Proportional Hazard, and Survival-Time Regressions 
Exploring Treatment Heterogeneity II. Missing Contingent Valuation Responses Imputed; with 
Sampling Weights. 
Variables OLS Cox Survival Time 
Dependent Variable: Duration of Hungry Season 
Contract Farming Participant 0.214 -0.023 -0.035 
 
(0.255) (0.109) (0.125) 
Contract Farming Participant x Girls -0.223* 0.115** 0.133** 
 
(0.119) (0.056) (0.063) 
Contract Farming Participant x Boys -0.158 0.020 0.026 
 
(0.119) (0.048) (0.055) 
Number of Girls in the Household 0.222* -0.078 -0.090 
 
(0.129) (0.055) (0.062) 
Number of Boys in the Household 0.122 -0.042 -0.049 
 
(0.136) (0.056) (0.064) 
Household Size  0.003 0.013 0.015 
 
(0.062) (0.029) (0.033) 
Dependency Ratio 0.219 -0.153 -0.168 
 
(0.602) (0.254) (0.288) 
Household Head Single  -0.251 0.045 0.078 
 
(0.347) (0.153) (0.175) 
Household Head Female  0.810* -0.254 -0.319 
 
(0.413) (0.189) (0.220) 
Household Head Migrant  0.117 0.054 0.045 
 
(0.256) (0.122) (0.139) 
Household Head Age  0.000 0.003 0.004 
 
(0.014) (0.006) (0.007) 
Household Head Education  -0.076*** 0.022** 0.026** 
 
(0.024) (0.011) (0.012) 
Household Head Agricultural Experience  -0.009 -0.004 -0.006 
 
(0.014) (0.006) (0.007) 
Household Head Member of Farm Organization 0.039 -0.114 -0.151 
 
(0.189) (0.093) (0.106) 
Days Agricultural Work Forbidden  0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Household Income  -0.003 0.000 0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Household Working Capital  -0.008 0.008*** 0.010*** 
 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
Household Assets  -0.016*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Household Landholdings  0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
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"Yes" to $12.50 Investment (Imputed) -0.432 0.124 0.144 
 
(0.410) (0.178) (0.203) 
"Yes" to $25.00 Investment (Imputed) -0.411 0.073 0.070 
 
(0.417) (0.186) (0.207) 
"Yes" to $37.50 Investment (Imputed) -0.288 -0.027 -0.023 
 
(0.322) (0.161) (0.189) 
"Yes" to $50.00 Investment (Imputed) 0.544 -0.065 -0.065 
 
(0.397) (0.180) (0.204) 
"Yes" to $62.50 Investment (Imputed) -1.148** 0.375* 0.430* 
 
(0.498) (0.216) (0.242) 
"Yes" to $75.00 Investment (Imputed) 0.084 -0.303 -0.328 
 
(0.409) (0.193) (0.219) 
Constant 5.628*** - -4.468*** 
 
(1.146) 
 
(0.606) 
    Observations 1,178 1,045 1,045 
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.212 - - 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A7. Estimation Results for Treatment Regression Specifications as in Bellemare (2012). 
  (1) (2) 
Variables No Imputations With Imputations 
Dependent Variable: Duration of Hungry Season. 
Contract Farming Participant -1.930** -1.783* 
 
(0.893) (0.986) 
Household Size 0.070* 0.068* 
 
(0.036) (0.037) 
Dependency Ratio 0.448 0.460 
 
(0.391) (0.389) 
Household Head Single -0.054 -0.056 
 
(0.359) (0.355) 
Household Head Female 0.452 0.476 
 
(0.434) (0.437) 
Household Head Migrant 0.077 0.073 
 
(0.245) (0.243) 
Household Head Age 0.010 0.011 
 
(0.012) (0.012) 
Household Head Education -0.071*** -0.070*** 
 
(0.024) (0.024) 
Household Head Agricultural Experience -0.024** -0.024** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) 
Household Head Member of Farm Organization 0.451* 0.420 
 
(0.270) (0.285) 
Days Agricultural Work Forbidden -0.004 -0.004 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Household Income -0.004** -0.004** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Household Working Capital 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Household Assets -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Household Landholdings 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 4.756*** 4.646*** 
 
(0.821) (0.866) 
   Observations 1,178 1,178 
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A8. Estimation Results for OLS, Cox Proportional Hazard, and Survival-Time Regressions. 
Monotonic Switching Enforced for the Contingent Valuation Responses; With Sampling Weights. 
Variables OLS Cox Survival Time 
Dependent Variable: Duration of Hungry Season. 
Contract Farming Participant -0.277* 0.166*** 0.188*** 
 
(0.145) (0.063) (0.071) 
Household Size 0.052 -0.013 -0.015 
 
(0.036) (0.015) (0.017) 
Dependency Ratio 0.517 -0.226 -0.247 
 
(0.366) (0.158) (0.181) 
Household Head Single -0.126 0.042 0.068 
 
(0.343) (0.147) (0.167) 
Household Head Female 0.732* -0.323* -0.390* 
 
(0.402) (0.175) (0.202) 
Household Head Migrant 0.064 0.014 0.009 
 
(0.219) (0.101) (0.115) 
Household Head Age 0.021** -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.009) (0.004) (0.005) 
Household Head Education -0.068*** 0.022** 0.026** 
 
(0.022) (0.010) (0.011) 
Household Head Agricultural Experience -0.029*** 0.005 0.004 
 
(0.010) (0.004) (0.005) 
Household Head Member of Farm Organization 0.091 -0.095 -0.125 
 
(0.183) (0.088) (0.100) 
Days Agricultural Work Forbidden -0.003 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Household Income -0.004** 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Household Working Capital 0.002 0.006*** 0.007*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Household Assets -0.013*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Household Landholdings -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
"Yes" to $12.50 Investment (Monotonic Switching) 0.218 -0.033 -0.027 
 
(0.217) (0.095) (0.107) 
"Yes" to $25.00 Investment (Monotonic Switching) -0.614*** 0.140 0.154 
 
(0.231) (0.099) (0.112) 
"Yes" to $37.50 Investment (Monotonic Switching) 0.008 0.020 0.020 
 
(0.232) (0.103) (0.118) 
"Yes" to $50.00 Investment (Monotonic Switching) 0.183 -0.144 -0.164 
 
(0.250) (0.122) (0.140) 
"Yes" to $62.50 Investment (Monotonic Switching) 0.063 0.021 0.022 
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(0.328) (0.153) (0.177) 
"Yes" to $75.00 Investment (Monotonic Switching) 0.293 -0.229 -0.240 
 
(0.415) (0.203) (0.228) 
Constant 3.793*** - -4.152*** 
 
(0.456) 
 
(0.256) 
    Observations 1,178 1,045 1,045 
R-squared 0.206  - - 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A9. Balance Statistics for Matched Sample with One Nearest Neighbor and 0.01 Caliper  
Variable 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
Mean 
Difference 
in Means t-statistic 
Household Size 5.768 5.572 0.196 1.240 
Dependency Ratio 0.447 0.445 0.003 0.070 
Household Head Single 0.083 0.109 -0.025 -0.630 
Household Head Female 0.055 0.071 -0.016 0.110 
Household Head Migrant 0.128 0.118 0.009 0.580 
Household Head Age 42.548 42.920 -0.372 0.740 
Household Head Education 5.988 6.014 -0.027 -0.360 
Household Head Agricultural Experience 20.115 19.830 0.285 0.670 
Household Head Member of Farm Organization 0.270 0.211 0.058 -0.130 
Days Agricultural Work Forbidden 23.583 25.328 -1.745 0.240 
Household Income 22.876 19.391 3.485 0.790 
Household Working Capital 6.562 4.761 1.801 1.540 
Household Assets 14.887 11.917 2.970 1.450 
Household Landholdings 172.130 143.430 28.700* 1.890 
District 1 0.177 0.173 0.004 0.000 
District 2 0.241 0.239 0.003 -0.470 
District 3 0.191 0.180 0.011 -0.220 
District 4 0.137 0.147 -0.011 0.620 
District 5 0.163 0.172 -0.009 0.140 
District 6 0.090 0.089 0.001 0.030 
"Yes" to $12.50 Investment  0.124 0.122 0.002 0.220 
"Yes" to $25.00 Investment  0.179 0.183 -0.003 -0.910 
"Yes" to $37.50 Investment  0.168 0.167 0.001 -0.360 
"Yes" to $50.00 Investment  0.165 0.129 0.036 -0.110 
"Yes" to $62.50 Investment  0.067 0.075 -0.008 -0.940 
"Yes" to $75.00 Investment  0.087 0.065 0.022 0.780 
"No" to Any Investment 0.209 0.259 -0.050 1.090 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A10. Balance Statistics for Matched Sample with Three Nearest Neighbors and 0.01 Caliper  
Variable 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
Mean 
Difference 
in Means t-statistic 
Household Size 5.768 5.589 0.179 1.080 
Dependency Ratio 0.447 0.445 0.003 -0.090 
Household Head Single 0.083 0.121 -0.037 -1.160 
Household Head Female 0.055 0.077 -0.022 -0.250 
Household Head Migrant 0.128 0.108 0.020 0.670 
Household Head Age 42.548 43.330 -0.782 -0.390 
Household Head Education 5.988 5.948 0.039 0.620 
Household Head Agricultural Experience 20.115 20.202 -0.087 -0.040 
Household Head Member of Farm Organization 0.270 0.221 0.048 -0.820 
Days Agricultural Work Forbidden 23.583 25.442 -1.859 0.170 
Household Income 22.876 18.380 4.496 1.990 
Household Working Capital 6.562 4.413 2.149** 2.170 
Household Assets 14.887 12.192 2.695* 1.740 
Household Landholdings 172.130 144.980 27.150* 1.890 
District 1 0.177 0.187 -0.009 -0.550 
District 2 0.241 0.229 0.012 0.450 
District 3 0.191 0.169 0.023 0.380 
District 4 0.137 0.154 -0.017 0.000 
District 5 0.163 0.170 -0.007 0.080 
District 6 0.090 0.091 -0.001 -0.530 
"Yes" to $12.50 Investment  0.124 0.131 -0.007 -0.430 
"Yes" to $25.00 Investment  0.179 0.176 0.003 -0.780 
"Yes" to $37.50 Investment  0.168 0.148 0.021 0.590 
"Yes" to $50.00 Investment  0.165 0.150 0.015 -1.020 
"Yes" to $62.50 Investment  0.067 0.071 -0.003 -0.540 
"Yes" to $75.00 Investment  0.087 0.067 0.020 -0.020 
"No" to Any Investment 0.209 0.257 -0.048 1.620 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
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Table A11. Balance Statistics for Matched Sample with Three Nearest Neighbors and 0.001 Caliper  
Variable 
Treated 
Mean 
Control 
Mean 
Difference 
in Means t-statistic 
Household Size 5.790 5.645 0.145 0.850 
Dependency Ratio 0.451 0.452 -0.001 -0.570 
Household Head Single 0.082 0.104 -0.022* -1.650 
Household Head Female 0.059 0.073 -0.015 -1.250 
Household Head Migrant 0.130 0.110 0.020 0.490 
Household Head Age 43.039 42.690 0.349 0.690 
Household Head Education 5.928 6.047 -0.119 0.160 
Household Head Agricultural Experience 20.586 19.554 1.032 1.740 
Household Head Member of Farm Organization 0.202 0.179 0.022 0.090 
Days Agricultural Work Forbidden 23.928 25.273 -1.345 0.060 
Household Income 19.707 16.242 3.465** 2.250 
Household Working Capital 4.920 3.903 1.017* 1.700 
Household Assets 13.511 11.726 1.785 1.140 
Household Landholdings 158.990 134.460 24.530* 1.880 
District 1 0.189 0.187 0.002 -0.020 
District 2 0.243 0.236 0.007 0.590 
District 3 0.171 0.176 -0.005 -1.100 
District 4 0.137 0.148 -0.011 0.350 
District 5 0.163 0.167 -0.004 -0.060 
District 6 0.098 0.086 0.011 0.220 
"Yes" to $12.50 Investment  0.132 0.132 0.001 -0.060 
"Yes" to $25.00 Investment  0.178 0.197 -0.019** -2.040 
"Yes" to $37.50 Investment  0.178 0.162 0.016 0.950 
"Yes" to $50.00 Investment  0.141 0.148 -0.007 -1.560 
"Yes" to $62.50 Investment  0.067 0.074 -0.007 -0.120 
"Yes" to $75.00 Investment  0.080 0.056 0.025 1.540 
"No" to Any Investment 0.223 0.231 -0.008 1.470 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
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